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 1 
The Apport of Modal Cognition to  
Information-Based Theories of Rationality 
Introduction 
 
Information-based theories of rationality offer a widely accepted system for evaluating 
the rationality of an agent‟s choice. All such models have to deal with seemingly 
irrational choices and with choices that do not reflect in actuality what the system 
predicts in theory. Hyperintensionality (where intensionality is not derived solely from an 
informational processing asymmetry, as, we will argue, in framing effects) and 
counterintuitive consequences of backward inductive reasoning present problems in 
choice and strategic reasoning that don‟t find easy or natural solutions within the 
information-based framework provided by such theories. Instances of intensionality – 
where the agent substitutes an internal sense for the reference in differentiating between 
options, to adopt a Fregean terminology – are typically handled by such theories by 
holding that when an agent is presented with two or several options that are normatively 
equivalent in the sense that they yield the same utility, the agent‟s systematic preference 
for one option among them exhibits a form of irrational behaviour, or at least a cognitive 
bias that should be explained in terms of a rationality failure on the agent‟s part. Such 
theories, that is, aim to solve the problems of intensionality and hyperintensionality by 
recourse to an information-based explanation – generally grounded in the concept of 
latent information: the agent regarded as salient and processed, as information, some 
information to which the experimenter or the theoretician was insensitive.  
 
We wish to spell out how some abilities peculiarly linked to modal cognition (i.e. our 
grasping of modal features such as possibility or necessity) allow for a finer analysis of 
these phenomena than an information-based understanding allows. We leave for a future 
paper a comparable analysis of how modal cognition interfaces with reasoning in some 
strategic situations, such as the backward induction paradox occurring in situations like 
the farmer‟s dilemma or the centipede game. The particular scope of this paper, then, is to 
give a taste of how an agent‟s sense of possibility (and modality generally) leads him to 
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biases in choices that a purely information-based understanding will relate to some form 
of irrationality on his part. We argue that this conclusion by information-based theories is 
due to their not taking into account the modal aspects of the situation at hand. We rather 
see features of modal cognition as being a significant ingredient of our characterization as 
rational beings: the explanatory reduction to irrationality of the agent‟s choice loses some 
of the richness of that choice.  
 
We replace the charge of irrationality by offering an enriched view of the decision that is 
grounded in the agent‟s modal abilities and spell out the fundamental cognitive features 
of such abilities of modal cognition in a way that captures the otherwise lost substance of 
the agent‟s choice.  
 
From this application, one can easily extrapolate how the modal cognition-enriched 
approach offers a valid avenue for the solution of several problems within rational choice 
without having to attribute irrationality to the agent.  
Information-based theories’ shortcomings in explanations of intensionality 
One of the contexts in which modal cognition displays its explanatory strength is in the 
evaluation of the Bayesian approach to rational choice. We retain two basic aspects of 
Bayesianism here: the ability to grant priors to states of affairs and the ability to revise 
those priors in face of new relevant information. While the competence required of a 
subject by an information-based theory of rationality is in fact often combined quite 
explicitly with the ability to manipulate modal notions – namely, counterfactuals and 
comparative possibilities – the role played by this ability has been largely ignored within 
the context of such theories. 
 
Information-based theories resort to latent information in the explanation of intensional 
effects in the following sense: the agent in his choice regarded as salient and processed, 
as information, some information to which the experimenter or the theoretician was 
unsensitive. That is, two or more options that were in principle normatively equivalent 
(and so regarded by the observer) are in fact not cognitively equivalent for the agent: he 
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discriminates among them, based on some subjectively sensitive information. This 
situation is most clearly evident in the context of framing effects.  
 
Framing effects, understood as intensional failures, are characterized by the 
inappropriateness of the subject‟s intensional approach, or the substitution of two 
equivalent (or co-referential) terms in a common context. Decisions influenced by 
framing effects constitute a paradigm of such possible failures. Generally, an agent‟s 
“framed” response is seen as a failure in rationality.1 We employ the concept of 
hyperintensionality to deal with situations where the intensionality expressed in the 
choices is not derived solely from an informational processing asymmetry. Modal 
cognition provides the tools for explaining framing effects without resorting to a charge 
of irrationality.
2
  
 
Framing effects comes under many guises. One typical instance is the Asian disease 
experiment: 
 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume 
that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs is as follows: 
 
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. 
 
A majority of subjects favour A over B. 
 
Those same options can be redescribed in the following way: 
                                                 
1  “[Kahneman and Tversky] consider it a basic condition of the person being rational that his choices not 
be sensitive to the descriptions he accepts of situations, to how he understands the facts involved, to how 
these facts are „framed‟ – they call this the principle of invariance. Others label it extensionality. The 
contrary of this is intensionality, and that is often said to mark a person as not being rational.” Schick, F. 
Making Choices, A Recasting  of Decision Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
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If program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 
600 people will be saved. 
 
Given this second description, a majority of subjects favour D over C, despite the fact 
that A and C and B and D are equivalent. The distinction in preference based on their 
description, between options that are deemed equivalent by the observer is diagnosed as 
irrational.  
 
C. McKenzie has led a series of experiments that tend to show that when choosing among 
differently framed normatively equivalent options, an agent has a particular reference-
point in mind according to which he implicitly assesses the chosen option
3
. McKenzie‟s 
central hypothesis is that the agent compares the framed option he prefers with a pre-
existing reference point (that is not spelled out in the set up) because it makes sense to 
him to make this comparison by resort to such a reference point: it would not be as 
relevant to make it with any other among the framed options. According to this 
interpretation, frames carry information beyond their literal content – including the 
information added by the agent in terms of a reference point. An agent is thus not only 
sensitive to a particular description of an option; he is also able to perceive how this 
particular description relates back in a relevant way to a certain reference point. 
McKenzie‟s illustration is clear: “The program to combat the Asian disease might more 
likely be framed in terms of lives lost if no one had ever died from the Asian disease 
before (and hence, zero deaths was the reference-point) than if the disease had routinely 
killed 600 people each year”. This solution, as we shall see, does not eliminate 
intensionality out of choices entirely: the reference point itself might be framed. That is, 
the reference point itself may be described in such a way that its correlation with the 
framed option seems natural or obvious to the subject [*while in fact…]. Originating 
framing effects is not exclusive of being one [let‟s try to say this more simply]. However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
2  In a related paper, “Backward Induction and Counterfactual Reasoning”, we discuss the solution offered 
by the same approach to the problem of backward induction and the farmer‟s paradox.  
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under this interpretation of framing effects, intensionality seems to be locally eliminated 
and rationality reinstated. The agent does not choose arbitrarily a certain frame; he 
chooses it because it relates to some relevant reference-point. 
 
Intensionality is locally eliminated if the reference points that subjectively trigger 
framing effects actually coincide with the (objectively triggered) reference points an 
observer might infer from observing a framing effect. For that to be the case framing 
effects must be related to objectively or publicly observable reference points; 
intensionality is to that extent eliminated. Bayesianism is furthermore restored in case, 
given a framing effect, an observer can predict the piece of background information that 
elicited the framing effect. The basic idea of McKenzie‟s approach is that the surplus of 
information provided by the description or frame is in principle publicly accessible by 
inferring reference points that most likely give rise to certain framing effects. McKenzie 
gives experimental results that tend to attest this coincidence. 
 
The remaining shortcomings of this framework‟s approach to intensional cases flow from 
two of its presuppositions. The first presupposition is that there can be, at least from the 
point of view of the subject, fully extensional representations of the choice situation that 
present intensional features from a normative standpoint. This means that the 
representations are, from the subject‟s standpoint, informationally complete. The second 
and correlative presupposition is that information is all that it takes to rationally 
discriminate among options within the choice situation.  
 
McKenzie‟s restoration of an information-based approach is, as we noted, local in the 
sense that some particular relation of comparison (in general in terms of higher or lower 
magnitude of some item) that the subject has in mind in choosing a certain frame is 
correctly inferred by an observer. In two respects, though, this local restoration of 
rationality is not the full-fledged reinstatement of an information-based framework. The 
first reason (related to the first presupposition) is that the comparison is in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 McKenzie, C., « What a speaker's choice of frame reveals: Reference points, frame selection, 
and framing effects » Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 10, 596-602. 
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positive or negative valence: the subject chose one of the framed options because, 
according to the context at hand, it represented more or less of some given item (lives, 
money, etc). However, valence-framing effects are typically new to some basic emotions 
or attitudes (such as optimism or pessimism). The possible emotional component that 
attaches to the biased choice is not avoided by the making explicit of the reference point 
involved in the framing effect, even if it reveals some latent information. The second 
reason (related to the second presupposition) is that, if another framed option was chosen 
(say B in the case above) instead of the one actually chosen, it would still be possible for 
the observer, according to McKenzie‟s interpretation, to infer which reference point was 
latent for the subject. Now it is most likely that an agent who chose option A because of 
reference point Ra, would not be willing to admit that he would have chosen option B if 
he had reference point Rb in mind instead of Ra. The fact is that, first, he did not have Rb 
in mind, and, second, if he were able to make this full comparison of options with their 
reference points available, either he would be irrational in not seeing the equivalence 
between options, or he would see the equivalence and thus the available explanation of 
framing effects in terms of special reference points would lose its grip on the problem. It 
thus seems better not to postulate too much lucidity on the observer‟s part about how 
reference points subjectively trigger framing effects. This means that intensionality is not 
completely locally eliminated even under an information-based approach such as 
McKenzie‟s. 
 
We offer a richer notion of decision-making that treats intensional cases without recourse 
to an explanation based on irrationality and that is not subject to the shortcomings of the 
purely information-based approach proposed by McKenzie. With respect to the first 
McKenzie presupposition, namely the possibility of extracting extensional 
representations of a choice situation even when it instantiates a framing effect, we apply 
the concept of hyperintensionality. In hyperintensional situations, intensionality cannot 
be merely attributed to an informational processing asymmetry.  
 
The second McKenzie presupposition leads to a more fundamental revision of the 
framework. The presupposition‟s shortcoming in these respects is due, as we saw, to a 
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conception of cognition that is based exclusively on information. We propose to spell out 
features of a cognitive ability that deals specifically with possibilities, and term it modal 
cognition. The introduction of this richer notion of cognition provides a more satisfying 
solution by avoiding the two pitfalls discussed above. 
 
While the information-based framework only deals with cases of intensionality caused by 
subjective information that is not shared, it may be the case that a choice was not due to 
some underlying subjective information but to an independent choice, or again to a 
preference not based on information processing. Framing effects may thus be due not to 
subjectively latent information but to some non-Bayesian preferences for a given 
description of an option. 
 
The concept of modal cognition  
 
Viewing the agent‟s choice failures, as understood by information-based theories of 
rationality, in terms of their ability to handle concepts of possibility, or modal cognition, 
makes those failures better interpreted and avoids the limitations of a purely information 
focused approach and the charges of irrationality it mandates. 
 
Modal cognition involves three separate abilities: the conceivability of something as 
possible, the ordering of those possibilities and the ability to reason counterfactually (as 
opposed to conditionally). We will analyze these abilities in turn and highlight how each 
plays a role in the solution of rational choice problems that pose challenges to the 
standard information-based theories.  
 1. Conceiving the Possible 
 
An agent‟s sense of possibility reaches farther than the possibilities that are actual, but 
conceivability does not necessarily entail possibility. The consideration of sets of 
conceivable options as sets of possibilities can thus run an agent into trouble. An example 
of this sort of trouble is given by modal illusions. Intensional phenomena in choice 
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situations may be due to a subjectively mistaken assessment of some option in the choice 
set as being possible while in fact it is not. An agent is subject to a modal illusion when 
two possibilities that are irreconcilable (although they are both conceivable) seem 
epistemically equivalent. An example of modal illusion would be for a subject to 
experience no epistemic qualms in accepting the possibility that water is not H2O while 
the subject also accepts some normative standpoint that brings forth the a posteriori 
necessity that water is H2O.  
 
Modal cognition provides the tools to explain the modal error that can occur in the form 
of two options in the set representing two possibilities for the subject while they are not 
in fact both possible, individually or jointly. An explanation of such phenomena in terms 
of modal errors need not resort to irrationality, much as an explanation of an arithmetic 
error in terms of mathematics need not do so. 
 
 2. Comparison and ordering of possibilities (choices) 
 
A separate ability governs the comparison between possibilities, the notion of modal 
distance (how far possible worlds are to the actual world), and the ordering of alternatives 
as more possible or less possible.  
 
This rating of possibilities, even conjunctive or complex ones, does not require an 
inferential structure of their inner construction. An agent is thus able to compare between 
possibilities without endorsing the theoretically corresponding counterfactual statements. 
The orderings, that is, do not correspond at times to more deductive frames of the 
comparison, nor do they require counterfactual thinking. Because of this, the way one 
orders possibilities does not necessarily correspond to one‟s acceptance of corresponding 
counterfactual statements. It is thus necessary to deal in understanding an agent‟s 
evaluations of possibilities with the distinction between modal intuitions, as discussed 
under the first ability, and ability to perform counterfactual reasoning. This cognitive 
distinction is ignored by information-based theories, which generally acknowledge but 
one type of quasi-deductive modal ability: conditional reasoning. The distinction 
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provided by an analysis in terms of modal cognition thus offers a richer view of the 
ability to compare and order possibilities.  
 
 3. Counterfactual reasoning 
 
A third ability within modal cognition helps explain the way agents differentiate between 
conditionals and counterfactuals, where the latter are seen as more akin to a sense of 
modality, while the former are more deeply rooted in pure deductive reasoning.  
Conditionals focus on actuality and are linear and future-oriented. Counterfactuals imply 
a shift from actuality and generally a reference to an unactualized change in the past. 
Unlike conditionals, counterfactuals require a full modal semantic for their interpretation.   
 
As already mentioned, the ability to reason counterfactually can be distinguished from 
the more basic ability to entertain modal intuitions. Counterfactual reasoning is, however, 
deeply rooted in that more basic ability.
4
 This can provide a reading key for some 
experimental data showing that levels of epistemic revisability in face of new or 
contradictory information differ widely in counterfactual and in conditional contexts. 
 
The general lesson of these three abilities is that significant biases or failures can occur 
when deductive abilities and features of modal cognition are combined.  
 
The Contributions of Modal Cognition to Rational Choice 
 
In this section we will preview how each of the three abilities outlined above provides the 
foundations for a richer interpretation of seemingly irrational choices. The specific 
example of modal illusions and framing effects will be dealt with in the following 
section.   
                                                 
4 Indeed, all three abilities build one on the other: ability one is prior to ability two, which is more complex, 
and ability three requires the mental tools of abilities one and two. We speak thus of three levels of modal 
cognition as well as of three abilities. We note that at level three, counterfactuals are conflated with 
conditionals; at level two, ordering possibilities may diverge from classification of corresponding 
counterfactual statements; at level one, conceivable options may not yield actualizable choices. 
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Apport of Ability 1 – Conceiving the Possible 
 
The understanding of the first ability of modal cognition offers simple solutions to the 
problems of modal illusions, that is, the problems caused by a sense of possibility that 
reaches farther than actual possibility. An agent may make seemingly inconsistent 
choices in allowing for one possibility while at the same time having agreed to the 
necessary nature of a state of affairs that is not reconcilable with that possibility. Instead 
of merely treating this instance as a case of agent irrationality, modal cognition‟s more 
refined understanding of conceivability of possibilities allows for the implementation, as 
later shown, of a two-dimensional modal semantics that solves the seeming 
inconsistency. The idea is to consider that the agent who seems to accept as possible one 
necessary (or impossible) statement and its negation does not regard as equivalent 
common terms as they appear in the different statements. There is a surface equivalence 
for the listener, but not a subjective equivalence for the subject, when the subject holds 
that necessarily water is H2O and, at the same time, water is possibly not H2O. The 
speaker has shifted the reference of his terms as if now they were merely homonymous 
from one context to the other. A 2-Dimensional Modal Semantics (2-DMS) framework 
clarifies the way in which the agent has shifted the reference of his terms. Of course a 2-
DMS-style explanation has to be cognitively plausible. Without fully discussing this 
question here
5
 we can rest on the remark that such a solution avoids attributing to the 
agent prima facie inconsistencies in his preferences and choices when two apparently 
irreconcilable options are equally accepted. The important point here, in analyzing the 
conflation of conceivable options and actualizable choices, is to think of how semantic 
shifts may underlie our acts of conceiving. It seems natural to use the words we have at 
our disposal as we master the reference of those words, in order to describe possible 
situations in which those words would lose or lack their usual reference. Without hinting 
at such blatant contradictions (such as the thought of a circular triangle), we can imagine 
that more subtle changes in the use of our words shape our intuitions of possibilities and 
may yield a heterogeneous (from the point of view of a normative semantic or modal 
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standpoint) domain of possibilities. The use of a disambiguating device such as 2-DMS 
keeps one safe from inconsistency while preserving heterogeneity. We shall present 
below how a 2-DMS approach can shed light on framing effects and spell out in some 
further details this framework. 
 
Apport of Ability 2 – Ordering of Possibilities 
 
A well-admitted thesis in the literature on counterfactuals is Lewis‟s equivalence between 
counterfactual statements and comparative possibilities statements. Informally, according 
to Lewis
6
, a counterfactual of the form  
 
If A were the case, then C would be the case 
 
is theoretically equivalent to the conditional possibility statements 
 
If A is possible, then the possibility that A and C is closer to actuality than the 
possibility that A and non-C.  
 
This equivalence, however, might be less than fully supported by cognitive data. Modal 
intuitions, in terms of what we are prone to agree with, are less constrained than 
counterfactual pieces of reasoning. We might refuse to accept as valid the counterfactual  
 
If Jupiter were closer to the Earth, the tides would have larger amplitudes  
 
and yet rate the unodered possibility set 
 
{stronger tides, Jupiter closer}  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 The reader is directed to the authors‟  “Backward Induction and Counterfactuals – a cognitive approach” 
[to appear].  
6 Lewis, D. “Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibilities”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2, 1973, pp. 
418-46. 
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as more likely than  
 
{no stronger tides, Jupiter closer}.  
 
An information-based approach ignores this distinction between levels of constraint. 
Therefore, something that amounts to a violation of a constraint in that approach, and is 
thus deemed irrational, appears not to have been subject to the constraint in the first place 
in a modal cognition approach. A modal cognition approach, on the other hand, provides 
the tools for interpreting the reasoning behind this sort of distinction.  
 
Apport of Ability 3 – Differentiating between conditionals and counterfactuals 
 
The distinction between counterfactuals and conditionals is fundamental for any theory of 
rationality. Information-based theories of rationality rely to a great extent on the ability to 
revise prior beliefs. In the analysis thereof, however, such theories do not distinguish 
between revisions in the conditional and in the counterfactual context. As documented by 
Byrne
7
, belief revisability occurs to a lesser extent in counterfactual contexts than in 
conditional ones. Byrne has experimentally shown, for example, that reasoners revise 
their beliefs in a factual conditional more than in a counterfactual conditional. In factual 
conditional contexts data show that reasoners facing contradictions do not tend to reject 
their premisses but seek to accommodate them in ways that solve the contradiction. In the 
case of counterfactuals there is a lesser tendency to “save” the reasoning from 
inconsistency and to adapt premisses and information in view of epistemic coherence. 
Contradictions are more at home in counterfactual settings. This is understandable if one 
sees that most reasons that lead an agent to revise in conditional settings do not have to 
hold when the same grounds for revision, such as the presence of new information 
contradicting some previously accepted premise, occur in a counterfactual line of 
reasoning. The different degree of revision may be due to the fact that the different modal 
intuitions that underlie counterfactual reasonings (like the intuitions that Jupiter could be 
                                                 
7  Byrne, R.M.J. & Walsh, C.R. (2002). « Contradictions and counterfactuals: Generating belief revisions in 
conditional inference » In Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
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closer to the Earth and the intuitions that the tides could be stronger, normally 
corresponding to the counterfactual statement that if Jupiter were closer to the Earth, tides 
would be stronger) do not necessarily mentally combine in truth-functional complexes 
but can remain unrelated, from a deductive or a compositional perspective, modal 
chunks. One can hypothesize that mental models underlying respectively conditional and 
counterfactual reasonings might differ as to their internal truth-functional consistency. 
 
S. Bourgeois Gironde and al.
8
 have more generally documented the fact that modal 
contexts imply lesser cognitive sensitivity to information and corresponding epistemic 
updatings than non-modal contexts. The perception of a modal operator tends to attenuate 
the effort to revise, even with respect to information that the subject would wish to update 
and keep coherent in absence of the modal operator. S. Bourgeois Gironde and al., for 
example, have measured reading times for short expository texts involving contradictions 
between their conclusion and one of the premisses. The study showed that, when the 
contradiction was embedded in a modal statement, the reading time of the contradictory 
statement is shorter than when it does not appear in a modal statement, tending to show 
that the subject is less sensitive to the presence of a contradiction in the scope of a modal 
operator and does not proceed to bridging inferences in order to see where overall 
consistency failed. 
 
This lends support to the notion that the ability to reason conditionally and that of 
reasoning counterfactually should be accounted for separately.
9
  
 
Not only does the agent tend to revise less his prior beliefs when they are embedded into 
counterfactual contexts, but also the comparison of possibilities and the attribution of 
distinct priors to possible alternate courses of action in a game-theoretic game does not 
                                                 
8
  Bourgeois Gironde, S., Palma, A., van der Henst, J.-B., Armeni, A., “Initial Review of the Results from 
the Modal Acceptance Experiment”, this website. 
  
 
9 Relevantly, the two abilities are often conflated in applied thinking about counterfactuals, e.g. in the legal 
context. The experimental results, as well as the three-level set up of the abilities, suggest that a more 
refined approach to counterfactual thinking is necessary for more careful applications.  
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systematically correspond, from a cognitive standpoint, to the associated counterfactual 
structure of the game. These basic features of modal cognition and the sui generis biases 
they create in reasoning tasks should be kept in mind when assessing the rationality of 
cognitive endeavours, such as the consideration of a set of options and the choice among 
them, which typically call for informational and modal competence. 
 
Modal Cognition’s Approach to Intensional Failures: The Problem of 
Hyperintensionality 
 
Not only complex strategic reasonings, but also basic choice situations, can exhibit 
intensional features, as the study of framing effects has widely shown. As discussed 
above, framing effects occur when two or more options which are logically or 
normatively equivalent lead to non-equivalent preferences or behaviours. This can be 
labelled an intensional phenomenon in the same sense as some words or sentences that 
share reference may not lead to the same epistemic or cognitive acceptance. In those 
cases, the key to understanding and discriminating between sentences, to adopt a Fregean 
terminology, is the sense – or the subjective cognitive impact – rather than the objective 
reference. Equivalently, one way to disambiguate between options that are normatively, 
but not subjectively, equivalent is to provide something like sense and context for those 
options. Subjective sense, in place of objective reference, is provided when, in particular, 
one interprets framing effects as conveying some particular perspective taken by the 
agent over the situation.  
 
We saw how a typical informational approach explains framing effects by resorting to a 
reference point. This is problematic because the subject‟s particular reference point could 
itself have been influenced by framing in the first place. This possibility would only be 
avoided by providing a justification for the choice of such a reference point. To do so, 
however, one must call back a series of reference points, which gives rise to an open 
regress. Intensionality, or specifically the framing effect, cannot be eliminated simply by 
indefinitely increasing the arity of a relation that seeks to make explicit latent 
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information. The informational framework, moreover, only deals with cases of 
intensionality caused by subjective information that is not shared. It may be the case that 
the choice of a particular option was not due to some underlying subjective information 
but, more fundamentally, to an independent choice, or again to a preference not based on 
information processing.  
 
Framing effects may thus be due not to subjectively latent information but to some non-
Bayesian preferences for a given description of an option; for this reason, information-
based theories do not fully explain framing effects. 
 
Framing effects based on the variation of some attribute of an option can illustrate this 
strategy. The alternate descriptions of the given medical treatment discussed above as 
resulting either in 75% survivors or in 25% mortality, while logically equivalent, may 
yield a preference for the 75%-described outcome if, by favouring this specific survivors-
frame, the agent implicitly relates it to a lower previous success rate of a similar 
treatment. The agent is, in this context, showing his sensitivity to the increasing rate of 
success in relation to a reference point he keeps in mind. The option chosen is located in 
a broader description of the situation encompassing different subjective perspectives. 
 
The conclusion of the information-based approach that the agent is acting irrationally can 
be avoided if the observer accepts that the choice situation may present some irreducibly 
intensional features – that is, the agent regards as irreducibly distinct options that are 
normatively equivalent. Where the situation is inherently intensional, it is incorrect to 
deem irrational the agent‟s intensional failure to realize the logical equivalence of the 
several options. What does it mean then for a situation to be “inherently intensional” and 
for the agent to be still acting rationally? It is merely the fact that the choices can be 
understood as several possibilities to be or not to be realized. The fact that under framing 
effects possible options are logically equivalent should not lead to different possibilities 
being anticipated by the subjects as normatively equivalent. If the subject is actually 
„victim‟ of a framing effect, his error in considering the two choices as non-equivalent 
should be interpreted as an error in modal reasoning. A modal error is not necessarily an 
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instance of irrationality because the error may be predicated on a conception of 
possibility by the agent that is hyperintensional and quite simply not shared. The error is 
modal in nature because it is based on a failure in perceiving the equivalence. The reason 
why the agent‟s attitude cannot be deemed necessarily irrational is that there is no 
necessary conclusion to irrationality of the agent if the agent is acting according to a 
private sense of possibility. The fact that the two options are normatively equivalent from 
the informational standpoint does not mandate that the two options be similarly 
equivalent in the agent‟s evaluation of possibilities. The diagnosis of modal error thus 
avoids the conclusion that the agent is acting irrationally, which appears unjustified once 
the hyperintensional nature of the choice is spelled out.
10
  
 
The substantive question about rationality and framing effects, in particular, is then 
bypassed thanks the analysis of the contribution a certain cognitive ability makes to 
decision processes. To spell out our diagnosis we will continue to tackle the problem of 
framing effects and will characterize it as a type of modal error. [** I don‟t think this 
paragraph is necessary – I am not clear about the first sentence]  
Framing effects and modal illusions: The Two-Dimensional Modal 
Semantics Explanation 
 
One way of explaining framing effects, without the reduction to the latent information 
framework, is, to borrow from the philosophical literature
11
 and say that the subject is 
victim of a „modal illusion‟. Let‟s spell out that suggestion and see how the agent‟s 
rationality can be preserved when choice situations are analyzed from a modal angle. 
To see technically the contribution of modal cognition to the solution of intensional and 
hyperintensional situations, let us start by looking at the isomorphism between framing 
effects and modal illusions.  
                                                 
10
  The meta-epistemic question is whether this procedure of disambiguation has to be systematically 
accepted by the subject when he is a victim of a modal error.  
 
11  See the anthology by Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J., “Conceivability and Possibility”, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 2002, especially the introduction where the philosophical notion of modal illusion is 
presented. 
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Framing effects share this common structure:  
 
 A indiff B  
 (two options are normatively equivalent)  
 
and still  
 
 A > B  
 (A is behaviorally preferred to B).  
 
Modal illusions exhibit the reverse isomorphic structure:  
 
 A ≈ B 
 (A seems epistemically equivalent to B) 
 
while in fact (from an accepted normative standpoint underlying modal judgements)  
 
 A >* B 
 (A is a closer possibility than B) 
 
Let us return to the previous example of a modal illusion where a subject experiences no 
epistemic qualms in accepting the possibility that water is not H2O while the subject also 
accepts some normative standpoint that would bring forth the a posteriori necessity that 
water is H2O.  
 
A first point to notice is the possibility that, given this isomorphism, the two situations of 
modal illusion and framing effects can be dealt with through a common framework; we 
believe that modal cognition offers that common framework.  
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Viewed in the context of modal cognition, a victim of framing effects can be said to have 
made a modal error, the diagnosis for which is found in 2-DSM. 2-DSM allows for a 
modalized sentence to be interpreted relatively to pairs of worlds rather than to worlds 
simpliciter. Any sentence, then, can be interpreted relatively to the actual world and 
relatively to any other world taken as actual; its modal or counterfactual content is then 
contrasted with either of the worlds considered as actual, whether actually actual or not. 
So in jointly admitting the stance that “Water could be different from H2O” and that 
“Necessarily water is H2O” the 2-DMS reading of the apparent inconsistency holds that 
in the first case the subject envisions as its reference point in one case the counter-actual 
world, and in the second case the actual world. 
 
2-DSM disambiguates reference-worlds for the interpretation of modal sentences but 
those reference-worlds are not exactly like the reference-points which were spelled out in 
order to make the choice of framed options informationally correct even though they 
share something with them: privacy. Their common ground is that a counter-actual world 
is associated with some private sense that the subject lends to a sentence. Even if this 
private sense can be found in more than one and even in a majority of subjects, counter-
actual worlds reflect subjective meanings people associate with the accepting of some 
sentence as possible while it is normatively impossible. People are facing an 
impossibility and they find private meanings that describe a possible scenario they 
circumstantially take as their reference-world. Now, intensionality would be limited, in 
the case of modal illusions, if the worlds people select as their points of evaluation could 
be systematically related to the actual world as we know it. This, however, can‟t be the 
case. In order for 2-DSM to properly apply, no backward reference to actuality (actual 
actuality) can be made in the context of a counter-actual standpoint, lest the latter 
immediately cease to be a full-fledged counter-actual standpoint. A resort to a 2-DSM 
explanation of modal illusions does not per se allow one to have it both ways: private and 
yet explicitly informational. 
 
This explanation is not based on an information-based framework and as such it does not 
resort to a charge of irrationality. Irrationality is avoided for the simple reason that 2-
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DMS is a disambiguating framework. It disambiguates the kind of modal context an 
agent has in mind when faced with several possibilities. If it were not a disambiguating 
framework there would be incoherence. But by providing a modal context for the agent‟s 
intuitions, the two intuitions appear as no longer related, and as such they can be jointly 
entertained without a conclusion of inconsistency.  
 
 
In both the framing effect and the modal illusion context, subjects make themselves blind 
to some informational equivalence between two options and favour one option/possibility 
over the other. Favouring one possibility can be interpreted as taking this possibility as 
implying a correlated reference world different from the one the other possibility would 
imply and failing to see that the two possibilities in principle refer back to the same 
world. We have here a kind of in-built modal illusion in the following sense. It is as if, 
indeed, the two options in a framing effect were not counterfactually related one to 
another by the subject, in which case their equivalence is not immediately perceived and 
can remained unperceived if there is no cognitive procedure which puts back together the 
separate modal intuitions. The subject does as if the two options reflected two essentially 
different things rather than two distinct descriptions of the same thing. In other terms the 
modal illusion is here deepened into a form of objectual illusion. The various options 
presented in a choice situation in which a framing effect arises are perceived as different 
objects even more than as different descriptions of the same object. This deepened 
illusion is not one in which an informational diagnosis has grip on. However it seems a 
plausible interpretation of what kind of errors are involved in framing effects. 
 
One can express the reverse isomorphism between modal illusions and framing effects in 
more than one way. In a modal illusion we need a disambiguating framework in order to 
realise that we use the same words to refer to different objects. In a framing effect we 
seem to disambiguate when we need not because the terms (the descriptions associated 
with the options) actually refer to the same object (option). When an agent rejects the 2-
DMS diagnosis for modal illusions because one maintains that he uses the terms to refer 
back to the same thing (for instance to water as we know it), one makes what could be 
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called a hyperrigid use of those terms: he wishes to maintain reference of those terms in 
context where such reference is not available. When victims of framing effects, on the 
contrary, agents do not see that descriptions bear on the same object, that is, they fail to 
see coreferentiality and show an extreme form of intensionality (in not allowing for the 
substitution of equivalent descriptions). 
 
This isomorphism between modal illusions and framing effects may be the symptom that 
those two types of cognitive biases may represent two faces of a common phenomenon: 
the role modal cognition plays in decisions as well as conceivability. This cognitive 
ability has some particular features and when conflated with other cognitive abilities such 
as reasoning or processing information, some apparent mistakes or failures may appear. 
One needs not diagnose deep irrationality though, to the extent that we are able to 
identify the biases and to disambiguate modal reference points (rather than informational 
reference points), we rather see the typical contribution that modal cognition make to 
decision processes, a contribution that was shadowed by purely informational approach to 
decision processes and biases attached to them. 
 
 
Framing effects and modal cognition, recap 
 
Some features of modal cognition contribute to the occurrence of framing effects, namely 
the fact that an agent sees distinct possibilities rather than seeing different descriptions of 
different informational pieces characterizing the same option and is not considered as 
irrational. What we are faced with is in fact a modal error, which can be diagnosed, and 
not merely an instance of irrationality. 
 
The modal cognition approach also captures the sense that dealing with counterfactuals is 
an intuitive process, not merely an informational framework. The intuitive process can be 
captured by an understanding of modal cognition, but there is no way that a purely 
information-based approach can get to the intuition about counterfactual reasoning.   
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If there are such correlations between framing effects and implicit reference-points, when 
faced with framing effects, one can justifiably infer that some information, under the 
guise of a reference-point, is latently processed by the subject [see McKenzie]. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A fuller understanding of the abilities of modal cognition offers a richer interpretive key 
for phenomena such as intensionality and hyperintensionality and offers significant 
contributions to an understanding of such seeming irrational choices as those evidenced 
by framing effects that does not require a charge of irrationality. This is but one 
application of modal cognition – other contexts, such as a revision of the backward 
induction paradox, further will show that modal cognition‟s contributions are quite rich. 
The modal cognition approach to intensional phenomena in choice-situations fits well 
enough within an information-based framework centered on the notion of information: it 
retains the assumptions that perspectives taken on situations can be spelled out in terms 
of relations between implicit reference-points and one of the framed options and that all 
there is to a subjective perspective in a choice-situation is some implicit information that 
can be made explicit.  
 
Such a richer sense of cognition is needed in choice and strategic reasoning, lest a 
subject‟s natural interpretations of modal situations be unnecessarily reduced to 
irrationality, with the subsequent loss of the full richness of the choice. 
 
At the same time, such an understanding of the underlying cognitive abilities may also 
weaken information-based theories, if this richer cognitive view shows that the decisional 
process can only partly be explained in terms of a processing of information. 
